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or reflux of the tide, or lightning, he is not held liable: Abbott on
Shipping (Perkins' ed.) 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, and cases
cited.
The bill will be dismissed.
LEGAL NOTES.
PARDON-DELIVERY-EvOCATION BY NEW EXECUTIVE. Jatter
of Moses De Puyi, in the District Court of the United States, for the
Southern District of New York (June 1869), was a petition for dis-
charge on habeas corpus. It will be recollected that the petitioner had
been convicted at the January Term 1869, of this court, of having
rescued distilled spirits from the custody of a revenue officer of the
United States, and on March 3d 1869, President Johnson had signed a
pardon, which was revoked by President Grant among the first acts of
his administration. The facts, which elicited much comment at the
time, appear by the judicial investigation to have been as follows: One
James M. Nelson presented a petition to the President on behalf of
De Puy, praying a pardon. On March 3d 1869, the President endorsed
on this petition a direction that a pardon be issued, and handed this to
Nelson with a direction to take it to the Attorney-General. Nelson
took the petition to the Attorney-General and -left it with him, re-
ceiving a letter to the Secretary of State, requesting the Secretary to
issue a warrant for the pardon of De Puy, with certain recitals. Nelson
took this letter to the Secretary of State, obtained a pardon which he
took to the President, procured his signature and brought it back to the
Secretary of State, who then signed it and directed his clerk to have
the seal put to it, and to transmit it, with a letter in relation to it, to
the Marshal of the Southern District of New York. Nelson asked if
he could not take the pardon, but was told that it must go by mail to
the marshal in the usual course of 'business. The pardon was dated
March 3d 1869, and recited the conviction of De Puy, and the reasons
in consideration of which the President pardoned him on condition of
the payment of the fine which was part of his sentence. This pardon
was sent by mail to the marshal, with a letter in the following terms :
"Sir, I transmit herewith the President's warrant for the conditional
pardon of Jacob and Moses De Puy, the receipt of which you will
please acknowledge. Yr. obt. servant, F. W. Seward." The pardon
and letter were received by the marshal March 5th 1869. On the
next day, while the pardon was still in the marshal's hands, he received
a message by telegraph from the Secretary of State directing him to
regard it as cancelled and return it to the State Department, which was
accordingly done. The invariable custom of the State Department in
issuing pardons, is to send them by mail to the United States marshal
of the district in which the prisoner is confinedpand the marshal
usually transmits them to the keeper of the prison. The turning-point
of the ease was as to the delivery of the pardon, the petitioners insisting
that the act of mailing it to the marshal was a full delivery in the. only
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manner recognised by the Executive Department, and passed the entire
control of the pardon out of the hands of the President, and entitled
the petitioner to his liberty on compliance with the condition-that is,
payment of the fine, which had been done. The district attorney, on
the other hand, contended that the marshal was a part of the executive,
and until the pardon had passed out of his hands and into those of the
prisoner or his agent, it was not delivered, and was therefore revocable.
BLATCHFORD, J., in giving judgment, made an elaborate review of
the subject of delivery in relation to pardons, citing Marbur v. Madi-
son, 1 Cranch 137; U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Peters 150, and Commonwealth v.
Hallowa, 44 Penn. 210, 2 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 474, and held, that as the
marshal in this case was the messenger of the President, and not the
agent of the prisoner, and there had been not only no delivery to the
prisoner, but none to the warden of the prison who had sole control and
custody of the prisoner, there had been no delivery of the pardon, and
it was legally revoked by the action of the President.
Our readers will find all the principal American cases on the subject
of pardons, collected in the note to the very curious and interesting
case of Commonwealth v. Halloway, 2 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 474.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO APPOINT
TO A VACANT OFFICE, WHEN THE VACANCY DID NOT OCCUR IN THE
RECESS OF THE SENATE. Schenk v. Pea1 and Bliss, in the United
States Circuit Court, District of Arkansas (April 1869), was a bill in
equity to quiet title to certain real estate as against one defendant, and
for partition as to the other. Peay, one of defendants, was the original
owner of the real estate; Bliss, the other defendant, was the purchaser
under i tax sale under the Direct Tax Act of Congress of 1861, and the
amendment of June 7th 1862, and Schenk, plaintiff, was a purchaser
from Bliss. Peay filed an answer and a cross-bill against plaintiff and
his co-defendant, which the court (MILLER, Circuit Judge, and CALD-
WELL, D. J.) after argument allowed, although Peay and Bliss were
both citizens of Arkansas, the parties being already before the court,
and the court being satisfied that the matters in the cross-bill were
strictly defensive to the original bill, and necessary to bring before the
court in a proper shape the defence relied on, and also that the interests
of Bliss, though he was nominally a co-defendaixt, were substantially with
the plaintiff and against Peny. The court also appointed a receiver on
the petition of plaintiff in the cross-bill, although defendants (in the
cross-bill) were in possession of the land under legal title.
The main question in the case, however, was the validity of the sale
by the tax commissioners, under which plaintiff claimed title. The
Act of June 7th 1862 (12 Stat. 422), -authorized the President to
appoint three persons who should constitute a board of tax commis-
sioners. The court held that all three must act to make the exercise
of their authority valid, and that the Act of March 3d 1865, § 3 (13
Stat. 502), declaring that a majority of the board should have power to
act, was not retrospective, and did not cure a title under sale by two
commissioners prior to the passage of the act.
Subsequently, on final hearing on amended pleadings, the 'court
(CALDWELL, D. J.) held:-
1. The Act of July 20th 1868 (15 Stat. 123), is retrospective in its
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terms, but does not give validity to the acts of two tax commissioners
unless there were three in office at the time.
2. One who was appointed to office without authority of law, and
who never performed any duty, and never had the reputation of being
such officer, is not an officer, de jure or defacto.
8. Where an office was created and took effect during a session of the
Senate, and that and a subsequent session of Congress passed without
the office being filled, the President could not make a valid appointment
to the office during the recess of the Senate.
On the last point the court- cited with strong commendation, and
relied on the opinion of CADWALADER, J., in The case of the District
Attorney, 7 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 786, and also People ex rel. v. For-
quier, 1 Breese 70.
The subject of sales under the Direct Tax Acts was elaborately con-
sidered in the opinion of CALDWELL, J., and the sale in this case
declared void, both for defect of jurisdiction, and for fraud in *the acts
of the commissioners.
ESTOPPEL TO ALLEGE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY O A LAW. Fer-
guson et al. v. Landrum et al., in the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
June 1869), decides a novel point in relation to the law of estoppel.
In 1864 the President of the United States ordered a draft for military
service. The people of Gallatin county, to avoid the draft, held a
public meeting and resolved to raise a bounty fund to induce the
requisite number of men to volunteer; and appointed a committee to
borrow the money, and obtain an Act of the Legislature authorizing
the levy of a tax to repay it. This plan was carried out, the act passed
by the legislature authorizing a bounty tax, the money borrowed, and
the volunteers obtained. In 1865 a number of citizens of the county
filed a bill to restrain the collection of the tax on the ground that the
act authorizing it.was unconstitutional, and the Court of Appeals so held
(ROBERTSON, J., dissenting) on the ground that thb United States
having called on the people for military duty as a government directly,
and not through the medium of the states, the state had no constitu-
tional power to levy an involuntary tax on the people of the counties to
give the Federal soldier an additional compensation, nor had it power to
levy such tax on those not liable to military duty, to aid those who
were, in avoiding its performance by the additional compensation to
volunteers. (On this point see Opinion of S. C. of MAaine, 2 A. L. R.
N. S. 621 ; Speer v. School Directors, 4 Id. 661; Booth v. Woodbury,
5 Id. 202; Taylor v. Thompson, 6 Id. 174.) But the most interesting
point is the farther opinion of the court, based on grounds of general
equity, that all persons liable to military duty, either in their own
pers6ns or those of their minor sons or slaves, had ieceived a valuable
consideration for the money loaned, and would not be allowed now to
refuse payment, and all who participated in the procurement of the
law, or afterwards voluntarily ratified the action of the committee under
it, were estopped from now setting up its unconstitutionality as a
defence to the collection of the tax under it.
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS-THE CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION
:IN IOWA. The County of Lee, Iowa, in 1857, under a statute of that
state, issued its bonds in aid of certain railroads. At the time of issue,
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the right to make such bonds was sustained by the Supreme Court of
Iowa. (Dubugue Uount v. Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Cfo., 4
Greene 1; State v. Johnson County, 10 Iowa 157, and other cases.)
Subsequently, in June 1862, in the case of State ex rel v. Wapello
County, 13" Iowa 390, the Supreme Court of Iowa overruled its pre-
vious decisions, and held that the constitution prohibited the issue of
such bonds, and that they were absolutely void. A holder of a similar
bond then brought an action in the Circuit Court of the United States
for the District of Iowa, and it was there decided, on the authority of
State v. Wapello County, that he could not recover; but, on a writ of
error, the Supreme Court of the United States, at the December Term,
1863, in Gelpeke v. City of Dubuque, I Wall. 175, said that although
it was the practice to follow the latest decisions of the state courts in
construing state laws and constitutions, yet it would not necessarily
follow a decision overruling previously settled law, and which might
prove to be a mere oscillation in the course of a judicial 
construction.
The court therefore held that the bonds were good, and refused to
follow the decision in State v. Wayello County, so far as regarded bonds
issued before that decision was made. This view has since been
affirmed in Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327, Rogers v. Burlington,
3 Wall. 664; while, on the other hand, the Supreme Court of Iowa has
adhered to its decision in State v. Wayello County in numerous subse-
quent cases : JMeyers v. Johnson County, 14 Iowa 47; M'cillan v.
Boffle, Id. 107; Rock v. Wallace, Id. 593; Smith v. .eFnry County,
15 Iowa 385, and Ten Eyck v. .Mayor of Keokuk, Id. 485.
F7rom this difference of views between the courts of the United
States and the state of Iowa, a conflict of jurisdiction has recently
arisen, which we should regard as very serious were it not for the good
judgment and moderation of the courts by which it must finally be
determined.
The county of Lee was one of those which issued bonds in aid of
railroads, in the year 1857. Interest on these bonds was paid for
several years, and in July 1860, a bill was filed by certain citizens and
taxpayers of that county, for an injunction to the supervisors of the
county to restrain the assessment and collection of any tax for payment
of interest or principal. The bondholders were not made parties to this
bill; the county officers alone were made defendants. The only relief
sought was to restrain the levy and collection of taxes by the county
officers for the payment of railroad bonds or coupons.
The case went on appeal to the Supreme Court, which, on December
1st 1862, gave judgment for complainants, and on June 5th 1863, entered
a decree nunc pro tuna, perpetually enjoining the defendants from
levying or collecting any tax for payment of said bonds: .Millan v.
Boyle, 14 Iowa 107.
This decision of the Iowa Supreme Court was made before the deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court in Gelpckav. City of Dubuque,
supra, and also before the commencement in the United States courts of
the action next to be mentioned.
In April 1863, J. Edgar Thompson, a citizen of Pennsylvania, and
a holder of bonds of Lee county, brought an action upon his coupons,
against the supervisors, in the United States Circuit Court for Iowa,
which was subsequently transferred to the Circuit of Northern Illinois,
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which, at the October Term, 1S64, rendered judgment for plaintiff.
The judgment being unpaid, and there being no property on which an
execution could operate, the United States Circuit Court for N. Illinois,
in July 1868, issued an alternative, and in October, a peremptory
mandamus to the supervisors of Lee county, commanding them to
levy a tax to pay the judgment. No return was made by the supervi-
sors to either writ. but on the day the peremptory writ was served on
them, they passed a resolution setting forth the above mentioned in-
junction, proceedings and decree of the Supreme Court of Iowa, and
that they were unable to comply with the mandate of the writ without
committing a contempt of the Iowa court, and violating their oath of
office to obey the laws of the state of Iowa. At the January Term,
1869, the Circuit Court, on application and proof of the foregoing
facts, issued an attachment against the supervisors for contempt in
disobeying the mandate of the mandamus. The opinion of DRUm-
MOND, J., will be found in full in Chicago Legal News, for January
16th, 1869.
Under this attachment, the United States marshal for Iowa, on
March 3d, took the supervisors in custody, but before getting out of the
state, was served with a habeas coitus issued by Judge BECK (of the
Supreme Court of Iowa) sitting at chambers, who, on hearing, discharged
the supervisors from custody. We have been furnished with a pamphlet
copy of the opinion of Judge BECK, and regret that its length prevents our
giving it in full. The first point made was on the jurisdiction of a state
judge to inquire on habeas corpus into the cause of detention after a
return setting forth that the prisoners were held under process issued
"by a court of the United States. On this vexdd point Judge BECK'S
donclusion is : "That where one is held in imprisonment under claim
of Federal authority, and it appears that such restraintis illegal, in that
the officer holding him has no power to do so under the law, his
authority therefor being based upon a judgment void for want of juris-
diction, the state court, under the writ of habeas corpus, has the power
to release from the imprisonment." The judge admits that the
authority of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Ableman v.
Booth, 21 How. 516, is against his conclusion; but expresses a confident
opinion that that case will be overruled when the point shall again arise
in the same court. Judge BECK does not claim any authority to examine
into the legality of the attachment for contempt on any other ground
than the want of jurisdiction of the court over the persons of the
supervisors, or the subject-matter in the mandamus proceedings.
Being of opinion that he had authority to inquire into the jurisdiction
of the court issuing the attachment, Judge BECK then proceeds to show
that it had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, because it was a
subject of concurrent jurisdiction in the United States and the state
court, and the latter having acquired jurisdiction first by injunc-
tion issued before the commencement of the action by Thompson,
its jurisdiction became exclusive by the well-settled doctrines of
comity. On this point the judge distinguished the case from R~qgs
v Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166, and Weber v. Lee County, Id. 210,
in which the Supreme Court of the United States decided (CHASE,
C. J., and GRIER and MILLER, JJ., dissenting) that the Federal courts
could issue mandamus to a state officer to do an act, from which he had
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been enjoined by a state court, the Federal court in those cases having
first acquired jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter.
The marshal has appealed from the order of Judge BECK to the
Supreme Court of Iowa, where the case (under the name of Jolman
et al. v. Fulton) has been heard by the full court, but not yet decided.
Should the court reverse Judge BECK'S order, the supervisors will be
remanded to the custody of the marshal, who will of course take them
before Judge DI)UMMI. OND, as commanded in the writ. If, however,
the court affirm Judge BECK'S order, the case will go to the Supreme
Court of the United States, whose decision will be final, and will, without
doubt, be promptly obeyed by the Supreme Court of Iowa. Indeed it
is proper to say in reference to that court, whose position has been
somewhat misunderstood, that, while firmly maintaining its right to
conclusively construe the laws and constitution of Iowa, it has from the
beginning of the difference of opinion between it and the United
States Courts, yielded a ready obedience to the judgments of the ulti-
mate tribunal, even when unconvinced of their intrinsic soundness.
Thus in Thornisonv. Lee County, 22 Iowa 206, (1867), plaintiff recovered
a judgment in the federal court upon railroad bonds, which would have
been held void by the state courts bad he sued originally in them.
Upon the record of this judgment he sued in the state court, and
recovered judgment, the Supreme Court of the state holding that the
judgment of the Federal court was conclusive, and the county could not
again raise the question of the constitutionality of the bonds.
The moderation and sincere desire to have every point settled in the
due and regular course of law, manifested by the Iowa court in every
apparent conflict like the present, is in praiseworthy contrast with the
hasty and reckless action of the New York court, in the matter of
Pratt referred to below.'
FEDERAL AND STATE AUTHORITY-CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION
IN NEW YORK. One J. H. Pratt was arrested (August 6th 1869) by
the United States Marshal for the southern district of New York, on a
warrant issued by United States Commissioner Osborn, charging that
said Pratt, on October 4th 1868, at Jefferson, in the state of Texas, did
commit murder by forcing the safeguard of United States troops and
killing certain persons named, and that he did then and there with
others commit the crime of treason against the United States. Pratt
was committed by the commissioner to the custody of the marshal, to
be produced for examination on August 9th, at 2 P. mr., and was by
the marshal placed in custody of the keeper of the county jail. On
August 7th, Judge McCuNN, of the Superior Court of New York,
issued a writ of habeas corpus to the keeper of the jail, commanding
him to produce Pratt before him (McCUNN) on August 9th, at 12 I.
At that time the jailer, following the course laid down in Ablenzan v
Booth, 21 How. 506, made return that Pratt was held under process of
the commissioner, setting forth the warrant, but not producing Pratt
1 Since writing the above, we learn that the Legislature of Iowa at its last
session, passed " an act to enable public corporations to settle their indebtedness"
ILaws 1868, ch. 67, p. 85,) under which the counties and towns indebted, are
taking up their bonds and paying in new bonds, so that this long and unpleasant
controversy will be speedily settled.
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Judge MCCUNN thereupon said that Pratt must be produced, and
directed the jailer to have him in court at 2 ,. i., on pain of attach-
ment for contempt. This was the hour at which the marshal had been
directed to have Pratt before the commissioner, and accordingly the
marshal, at about half past one o'clock, took Pratt in charge and
brought him before the commissioner. At 2 o'clock the jailer came in
and requested the commissioner to allow Pratt to be taken before Judge
M CUNN, which the commissioner refused. After consultation, how-
ever, and under the supposition that the production of Pratt would be
sufficient, and that the judge would not assert further jurisdiction, the
marshal took Pratt over to the court-room and allowed the jailer to
produce him before Judge MCCUNN. Judge 1MCCUNN however pro-
ceeded to hear the case on the merits, and after argument by Pratt's
counsel and the United States District Attorney, made an order
remanding Pratt to the custody of the marshal pending his decision.
The marshal, claiming to hold Pratt not under any such remand but
under the commissioner's warrant, removed him to Fort Schuyler for
greater security.
On the 11th Judge McCuGNN delivered an opinion discharging Pratt,
on the ground that the warrant was not a legal commitment, because,
first, the charge of treason, if taken unconnected with the acts alleged,
was too general to be valid, and if taken in connection with the acts
charged, they did not amount to treason; and secondly, the charge of
murder as set forth, was a crime not against, the United States, but the
state of Texas, and the commissioner in New York had no jurisdiction
to arrest for such cause.
On the following day the marshal was served with an order signed by
Judge McCuNN, entitled "In the matter of J. H. Pratt," commanding
John H Tracy (the jailer) and Francis 0. Barlow (the marshal) to dis-
charge Pratt from custody. It will be observed that the marshal,
though named in this order and served-with a copy.of it, was not in
any way a party to the proceedings, or judicially before Judge McCUNN.
He was not named in the habeas corpus nor served with process, nor
was the jailer (against whom alone the writ issued) his agent or deputy.
(See Randolph v. Donaldson, 9 Cranch 76.) The marshal, therefore,
considering that Judge ICCUNN had no jurisdiction to examine the
merits of the case after being judicially informed that the prisoner was
held under the warrant of a United States commissioner. (Ableman v.
Booth, 21 How. 506), and also that even if there was jurisdiction -in
Judge McCUNN to make such order, the marshal not being party to the
proceedings could not be bound by it, refused to discharge Pratt, and
to prevent a rescue and protect himself from arrest for contempt by
Judge MICCUNN, he called upon the United States military authorities
for a guard, which was accordingly furnished. Some prominence was
given to this part of the case by the fact that the President, being in
New York, was consulted by the marshal, and ordered the commanding
officer at Fort Schuyler to furnish whatever force should be necessary to
protect the marshal in the discharge of his duty. Judge ICUNN
thereupon prepared an order to the sheriff of New York to take Pratt
by force out of the possession of the marshal and the commandant of
Fort Schuyler, but this order was not issued, as on August 16th, Com-
missioner Osborn, on final hearing, discharged Pratt from custody, for
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want of evidence to sustain the charges on which the warrant had
issued. With this the whole matter terminated.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-RIGHT TO VOTE-TEST OATH. Green v.
Shumwa# et al., in the Court of Appeals of New York, was an action
against the inspectors of election of the city of Syracuse for refusing
to receive plaintiff's vote at the election, in April 1867, for delegates to
the Constitutionalh Convention. The Act of Assembly of New York
providing for the convention and the election of delegates to it, provided
that no person should vote who would not, if duly challenged, take the
following oath: 1:1 do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never
voluntarily borne arms against the United States since I have been a
citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given no aid, countenance,
counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility
thereto; that I have neither sought nor accepted, nor attempted to
exercise, the functions of any office whatever under any authority or
pretended authority in hostility to the United States; that I have not
yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority,
power, or constitution within the United States, hostile or inimical
thereto; and did not wilfully desert from the military or- naval service
of the United' States, or leave this state to avoid the draft during the
late rebellion."
The plaintiff was challenged and refused to take the oath, whereupon
defendants rejected his vote. 'The court, per MILLER, J., held the law
requiring such an oath invalid, being in violation of the constitutions
both of the United States and of New York.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-CONTRACT TO SUPPLY PATENTED AR-
TICLE-NICHOLSON PAVEMENT. Astor v. The Mayor, &c., in the
Supreme Court of New York, was a bill for injunction against the
paving of Thirty-third street, in the city of New York, with Nicholson
pavement, on the ground that the law required that all work done for
the corporation should be on contract made with the lowest bidder, after
public notice, &c., and the pavement being patented could not be the
subject of public competition, and the contract ivas therefore unlawful.
The same point was decided in opposite ways in Dean v. Charlton, 7
Am. Law Register 564, and Hobart v. Detroit, Id. 741. The court,
INGRAHAM, J., held that the article in the charter and the statutes of
New York did not apply to such a case, and dissolved the injunction,
citing the two cases already mentioned, and also People v. Flagg, 17
N. Y. 584, and llarlem, Gas Co. v. Mayor, 33 N. Y. 309.
ECCLESIASTICAL TRIBUNAL-INTERFERENCE BY A COURT OF
EQUITY. Charles . Cheney v. Samuel Chase et al., in the Superior
Court of Chicago (August 1869,) was a bill for injunction. Complainant
was a minister of the Episcopal church, and defendants were also
.ministers of that church claiming to sit as a 'court for the trial of
plaintiff, on the charge of having, "on divers occasions within the last
two years or within the last six months, omitted the words 'regenerate'
or ' regeneration,' in the office of infant baptism." The bill set forth
that the court was not constituted in accordance with the canons of the
church; that the proper notice was not given complainant; that at least
one member of the court had expressed beforehand an opinion of
VOL. X=II.-40
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complainant's guilt, and that his right of challenge was denied; and
that the presentment did not specify time, place or circumstances of the
offence alleged, or the names of witnesses to be called to prove the
allegations. The case was fully argued by distinguished counsel on
both hides, and the court, JAIESON, J., commenting with much severity
on the proceedings of the ecclesiastical court, held all the objections in
the bill to be good, and awarded an injunction. His judgment was
delivered orally (in advance of a full opinion to be filed hereafter), and
is reported in the Chicago Legal News for August 7th, from which we
extract the following synopsis --
1. If an ecclesiastical tribunal proceeds to try an offender who is a
church member, according to the canons of the church, a civil court
has no right to interfere; but if such ecclesiastical tribunal transgress
such canons, and thereby injure the temporal rights of the accused, the
civil courts will, upon proper application, interfere.
2. An ecclesiastical court in this country is nothing more than a
voluntary association of individuals.
3. Under canon 20 of the Protestant Episcopal Church, in the
Diocese of Illinois, the bishop can only institute proceedings for the
trial of a person for offences, on information coming to him from one of
three sources-from a majority of the vestry, from three presbyters of
the church, or from public rumor, and it is not sufficient for him to say
that he has been "1 credibly informed," &c.
4. Under the canons the bishop should select eight persons, out of
whom the accused has the right to select five, and also to twenty days'
notice from the bishop in which to make the selection.
5. The accused has the right of challenge.
6. When the members of an ecclesiastical tribunal have no right to
proceed at all, it will be presumed that they intend all that may befall,
even the worst consequences, under the canons of the church.
7. The presentment should state the offence clearly; giving time and
place, and it is insufficient to state that the accused has omitted the
word regeneration in the infant baptism service on divers occasions within
the past two years, without specifying the time, or place, or circumstances,
or names of the witnesses who were -to be called against the accused.
8. The wrongful deposition of a minister of the gospel, who is
receiving a salary, is such an injury to his temporal rights, as will call
for interference by a court of equity.
It is understood that the case goes by appeal to the Supreme Court of
Illinois.
INCOME TAX-MEANING OF THE WORD " PERSON"-SHAKER COMx-
MUNITY. Commissioner Delano has decided that- the word person in
the Internal Revenue Acts, for the purpose of taxation on incomes,
includes an association or community holding its property in common,
like the Shaker Community at New Lebanon, Ohio. This is a commu-
nity of forty-six covenanting male members, making return through one
Boyd, of the entire income of the community, and claiming to deduct
$1000 for each member. The commissioner holds that this is not
correct; that the community is a person within the lets, and is entitled
to only one deduction of $1000. This is in reversal of a previous
decision of Commissioner Lewis, but is supported by a late decision of
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the Supreme Court of Ohio, which held, in Boyd v. Lackey et al. (not
yet reported), that the individual members of this community are not
tax-payers within the statute requiring a petition for highway to be
signed by a majority of resident freehold tax-payers. The letter of
Commissioner Delano will be found in full in 10 Int. Rev. Record 39.
ADMIRALTY-COLLISION ON THE HIGH SEAS BETWEEN STEAMER
AND SAILING VESSEL CARRYING FORBIDDEN LIGHT-APPLICATION
OF STATUTORY RULES WHERE FOREIGN VESSEL IS CONCERNED.
Sears et al. v. Steamer Scotia, in the District Court of the'United
States for the Southern District of New York (Feb. 1869), was a libel
by the owners of the American ship Berkshire, against the British
steamer Scotia, for loss by collision. It appeared that about two o'clock
in the morning of April 11th 1867, in the Atlantic Ocean, the Berk-
shire was sailing, with the wind somewhat free, on a course, as set
forth in the libel, S. E. by E. half E., and the Scotia was steering W.
by N. half N. The Berkshire discovered a white light on her port
bow four or five miles off, which seemed to come directly towards the
Berkshire, whose helm was put to starboard. The Scotia had all her
regulation lights set, and on discovering & white light on her port bow
apparently about five miles off, ported her helm and kept on, taking the
light to be a steamer. The light appeared to recede gradually from the
Scotia's bow until very shortly before the collision, when it began to
close in, and the Scotia at once reversed her engines, but too late to
avoid the collision.
The Berkshire claimed that the Scotia was in fault as she had time to
avoid the Berkshire, but put her helm to port knowing that the Berk-
shire had the wind free, and attempted to cross her bows. The Scotia
claimed that the course of the Berkshire was more southerly than was
alleged in the libel, and that she was in fault because she had only a
white light carried low down on her anchor stock, thereby violating the
laws both of England and America, and leading the Scotia to suppose
it was a steamer too far off for her colored lights to be visible, and that
the Scotia's action in porting her helm, under the circumstances, was in
accordance with the laws of both England and America,
The new and important question involved was, whether the Scotia,
being a British yessel, could set up as a defence the violation by the
Berkshire of the statutes of the United States. The court, BLATCH-
FORD, J., held that it could not; that a foreign vessel cannot set up
against an American vessel a statute which is not mutually binding, and
which would not therefore be available in favor of the American vessel
against the foreigner; citing The Dumfries, 1 Swa. 63; The Zollverein,
Id. 96; Cope v. Dougherty, 4 K. and J. 367, 389, 390, s. c. on appeal,
2 De G. and J. 614; The Saxonia, 1 Lush. 410; The Chancellor, 4
Law Times N. S. 627; and Williams v. Gutch, 14 Moore P. C. C. 202.
The claim on the part of the Scotia that the statute of the United
States should be enforced in her favor because the rules prescribed by
the British and American statutes are the same, was held not to be
tenable. The court said that the practice of the English courts to
enforce the English rules against vessels of other nations was founded
upon the Queen's orders in Council, under the authority of sect. 58 of
the Merchant Shipping Amendment Act of July 29th 1862, which
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provides that whenever it is made to appear to her Majesty that the
government of any foreign country is willing that the regulations shall
apply to the ships of such country when beyond the limits of British
jurisdiction, her Majesty may by order in Council so direct, and the
passage of the Act of Congress of April 29th 1864, prescribing rules
for American vessels substantially identical with the British, was
properly taken as an expression of willingness on the part of the
American government that the British rules should be so applied. The
Act of Congress, however, contains no such authority for courts of the
United States to apply the rules prescribed by it either in favor or
against foreign vessels.
"The merits of the collision in this case," said BLATCHFORD, J.,
"must therefore be adjudicated according to the rules of navigation and
usages of the sea which usually prevailed and were customarily observed
at the time and place of the collision, among the ships which navigated
the waters where the collision took place: Tihe .FPenoord, 1 Swabey
374, 377. I can have no hesitation in saying what such rules and
usages were, when I find them to have been before that time adopted,
with such identity, by nearly.all the nations whose ships usually navi-
gated the waters where this collision took place, embracing, among
others, the United States, Great Britain, France, Spain, Prussia, Russia,
Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Bremen, Denmark, Hamburg, Lubec,
Hanover, Schleswig and the Netherlands. I rest my decision on that
ground, and not on any municipal statute or statutes, as such, of the
United States, or of Great Britain, or of both countries. I have not
been referred to, nor have I met with, any case in the United States in
which this question is discussed or decided. I must, therefore, resolve
,it on principle. But I have no hesitation in saying, that the result I
have arrived at is very satisfactory, as bearing on the interests of
commerce and the safety of human life, in substituting fixed written
rules observed by all the maritime nations, for those which, it is no dis-
paragement to say, were not as definite or certain, or as universally
recognised."
On this ground therefore the court held that the Berkshire was in
fault, both in carrying a white light and in not carrying colored lights.
The answer, however, the court said must be amended so as to set up
properly the fact that the Berkshire did not, as to lights, comply with
the rules of navigation and the usages of the sea, customarily observed,
at the time and place of the collision, by the vessels which navigated
the waters where the collision took place. On the answer being so
amended, the libel would be dismissed with costs.
.ADMIRALTY-DAMAGES TO SEAMAN FOR NEGLECT WHILE SICK.
Tomlinson v. .Hewett, in the United States District Court for California,
was a libel for damages against the master of a vessel. Libellant was a
seaman, and while on board ship was taken with small pox. The cap-
tain on assurances that he had made arrangements for his care, induced
the seaman to go in a small boat to a town some fifteen miles up the
river. On arriving there he found not only no such arrangements
Wade, but no physician living there, and he had enly $17 given him
by the captain. He accordingly returned, but was not allowed to come
aboard the vessel, and finally went in the small boat six miles down the
